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ABSTRACT

Merging Subsistence Perspective and Buen Vivir: An Alternative to
Damming the Mekong
by
Aaron Eisenberg

Advisor: Michael Menser

This paper will examine the planned development on the Mekong by looking at the historical,
political, and economic reasons why largescale hydroelectric dams are now being pushed upon the
river. It will then critique the international state sovereignty system focusing directly on the Mekong
River Commission and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) for their inabilities to
mitigate environmental impact while pursuing development. I analyze how the “global city”
discourse cannot rationally be applied to Southeast Asia and how the urban-rural divide in Southeast
Asia creates only greater problems as dam production on the Mekong accelerates. I propose an
alternative vision for the future on the Mekong that recalibrates development into an ecologically
sustainable and attainable form by using historical context from James C. Scott in conversation with
the theoretical visions championed by Maria Mies on subsistence and the conception of Buen Vivir.
I will then use the theories on social change from George Katsiaficas and Felix Guattari with
examples of resistance in the region to showcase how this can be attained.
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Introduction
Rivers are the veins of the earth. From their source, they trickle into streams and then flow
onwards to link the world, connecting the rural to the urban and farms to industry easing the
challenges of land transport. Civilization began in their basins as rivers provided the silt and
sediments needed for agricultural production. Rivers create borders by naturally delineating and
outlining territories, which makes control of a river’s flow a political act. Along with sea coasts,
rivers are where commerce, cultures and communities interact to exchange ideas, values, and
beliefs. Since the first agricultural settlements on riverbanks, all states have tried to harness and
use rivers to their advantage. By controlling them, states can increase trade, irrigate their lands and
augment their agricultural production. Today, many states are trying to control rivers for their
hydroelectric capabilities. This is one of the leading challenges to our collective future, as these
hydroelectric power plants and dams break down ecosystems and create new conflicts. In Asia, we
can see these transformations occurring in real time.
The majority of the great rivers in the world are located in Asia. All of Asia’s great rivers,
whether the Ganges and Indus in South Asia, or the Yangtze and Yellow in East Asia, begin in the
mountains of Tibet. It makes sense then that the great river of Southeast Asia would also begin in
the Tibetan highlands. Unlike the Yellow, Indus and Ganges which are so overused and overtapped
that they no longer flow out to sea for months on end, the Mekong, the lifeblood of Southeast Asia,
still flows continuously over three thousand miles across seven different countries before making
it to sea off the coast of Southern Vietnam. Unfortunately, the lessons of the Yellow, Indus and
Ganges have not been learned as the allure of controlling the river’s flow is too strong and the
Mekong currently has the highest planned rate of hydropower growth of any river in the world.1
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"Requiem for a River," The Economist (US), February 13, 2016.
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Figure 1. Map of Mekong River

This paper will examine the planned development on the Mekong by looking at the
historical, political, and economic reasons why largescale hydroelectric dams are now being
pushed upon the river. It will then critique the international state sovereignty system focusing
directly on the Mekong River Commission and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)
for their inabilities to mitigate environmental impact while pursuing development. From there, in
the section entitled Urban-Rural Divide, I analyze how the “global city” discourse cannot
rationally be applied to Southeast Asia and how the urban-rural divide in Southeast Asia creates
only greater problems as dam production on the Mekong accelerates. Then, in the section entitled
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Alternative Futures, I will propose an alternative vision for the future on the Mekong that
recalibrates development into an ecologically sustainable and attainable form by using historical
context from James C. Scott in conversation with the theoretical visions championed by Maria
Mies on subsistence and the conception of Buen Vivir. I will then use the theories on social change
from George Katsiaficas and Felix Guattari with examples of resistance in the region to showcase
how this can be attained. To understand why this is necessary though, we must examine and
understand why the Mekong is so important.

The Mekong in History
Along its path, the Mekong’s name changes from the Dzachu for Tibetans, the Lancang
Jiang for the Chinese, the Mae Nam Khong for the Thai and the Laotians, the Tonle Thom, Tonle
Sap and Tonle Thuc for the Khmer in Cambodia, and the Cuu Long for the Vietnamese.2 Despite
the various names and so many different cultures through which the Mekong flows, each of these
disparate peoples share a critical value—the Mekong is their lifeblood. It is the basis of their
livelihood. In fact, the Mekong is the largest river in the world which serves as the primary source
of nutrition for a vast number of people.3 The fisheries on the Mekong alone provide livelihoods
to 60 million people. As the lead source of water and food, the Mekong is relied upon by more
than 300 million people from over 100 different ethnic groups.4 While it touches seven countries,
it is primarily in the Lower Mekong Basin areas of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam that the Mekong
has its largest influence.

2

Edward A. Gargan, The Rivers Tale: A Year on the Mekong (New York: Vintage Books, 2003), 5.
Vincent H. Resh, "Multinational, Freshwater Biomonitoring Programs in the Developing World: Lessons Learned
from African and Southeast Asian River Surveys," Environmental Management 39, no. 5 (2007):
doi:10.1007/s00267-006-0151-8.
4
"Conserving the Mighty Mekong River," WWF International, accessed March 31, 2018,
http://wwf.panda.org/?200000/Conserving-the-Mighty-Mekong-River.
3
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Until the seventeenth century, the Mekong Delta and specifically the Lower Mekong Basin
were a region of swamps, forests and grasslands with the placid large river flowing through it.
Aside from the Kingdom of Angkor based near the Tonle Sap Lake, the Mekong had not been
viewed as a seat of empire. This allowed the river to form and flow naturally for millennia to
develop into its current form. After Angkor, the Lower Basin was part of the Khmer Empire. It
wasn’t until Vietnamese settlers asserted sovereignty in 1802 that any effort to transform the
natural land began on the lower Mekong.5 James C. Scott notes the irregularity of this by saying
how “striking” it was that the Mekong was not settled in force and planted with rice until the early
twentieth century.6 This allowed for the Mekong’s biodiversity to grow and flourish.
Not having major cities or empires settle along the Mekong allowed for generations of
small-scale subsistence agriculturalists and fisher peoples to live in harmony with the pristine river
as their life support. In their profile of rural residents of Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia, Clara Mi
Young Park and Margherita Maffii demonstrate that the people of Ratanakiri have Traditional
Ecological Knowledge (TEK) of practicing agriculture along tributaries of the Mekong River
dating back centuries. In the literature on the “environmentalism of the poor,” these rural residents
along the Mekong would be called “ecosystem people.” They are reliant on living within their
local region with customs based on TEK and processes that date back “as far as the memory can
go back in time.”7 In a region like the Mekong, at minimum this surely means that they go back
further than the settling of the Mekong in the early twentieth century.
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Timothy Gorman, "Moral Economy and the Upper Peasant: The Dynamics of Land Privatization in the Mekong
Delta," Journal of Agrarian Change, October 21, 2013, doi:10.1111/joac.12047.
6
James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 2011), 51.
7
Clara Mi Young Park and Margherita Maffii, "‘We Are Not Afraid to Die’: Gender Dynamics of Agrarian Change
in Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia," The Journal of Peasant Studies 44, no. 6 (October 24, 2017),
doi:10.1080/03066150.2017.1384725.
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After the Amazon, the Mekong is the second most biodiverse river in the world. It is also
the most biodiverse per capita of all rivers.8 However, the full extent of the Mekong’s biodiversity
remains relatively unknown and understudied. This leads to continuous new discoveries along the
Mekong. In 2009 alone, 145 new species were discovered including 29 new fish species and 96
plant species.9 Currently, there are three times as many known species in the Mekong as the
Mississippi River, yet, there have been 10,000 times as many scholarly articles published on the
fauna of the Mississippi than on the Mekong.10 The interactions between species, and the continued
potential for new discoveries should make the Mekong a hotbed for scientific innovation and
perhaps a protected region. As climate change endangers such a large percentage of our planet’s
biodiversity, the ability to discover new species becomes increasingly rare. Areas like the Mekong
with its biodiversity should become more valuable. However, this does not equate to reality in the
modern world as there is no economic value attached to future generational stability within the
short term profit motive of a global capitalist system.

Unfortunately, geopolitical and

socioeconomic concerns make this a dream unrecognized as the quest for economic development
has overtaken conservation concerns causing study of the biodiversity of the Mekong to be an
afterthought in opposition to continued growth.

ASEAN and Growth
The Mekong River is the seventh largest river in Asia and twelfth largest in the world. The
largest city directly on the Mekong is Phnom Penh with 1.5 million inhabitants.11 There were no
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G. Ziv et al., "Trading-off Fish Biodiversity, Food Security, and Hydropower in the Mekong River Basin,"
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109, no. 15 (2012): , doi:10.1073/pnas.1201423109.
9
Nancy Gephart et al., New Blood Greater Mekong New Species Discoveries 2009 (WWF, 2010).
10
Patrick McCully, Silenced Rivers: The Ecology and Politics of Large Dams (London: Zed Books, 2001), 48.
11
Ho Chi Minh City is located nearby on the Saigon River but is located outside the Mekong Delta, it is located in
the Lower Mekong Basin though.
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bridges on the lower Mekong until 1994. By not having major cities or industry on it for so long,
the Mekong was able to outlast many of the other major rivers of the world in remaining pristine
and maintaining a dynamic and vibrant ecosystem.12 The river’s basin, or the Lower Mekong
including portions of Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, is home to roughly 70 million
people. Of the seven countries that the Mekong flows through, five are in ASEAN.
ASEAN was created on August 8, 1967, as Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand formed a social and political union. At the time of formation, Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia were engulfed in the Vietnam War and the countries of the newly formed
ASEAN saw this union as their way of protecting themselves. Today, ASEAN has expanded to
ten member countries — Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. No longer is this political union seen foremost for stability, it
is now viewed as a driver of economic growth and a path to uplifting the Southeast Asian nations
on the global stage.
The 1970 global population was 3.7 billion people and the 1970 population of Southeast
Asia was 285 million people. Today the world has 7.4 billion people of which ASEAN has
approximately 625 million people. Last year ASEAN turned fifty. In analyzing ASEAN’s success,
the desire for economic growth above all else has made the effects of climate change underreported
as researchers, journalists and leaders alike have chosen to only focus on how ASEAN functions
as a business place.13 This is largely to due to the fact that the countries of ASEAN remain
relatively poorer geopolitically. To the world, ASEAN as an economic union presents an
opportunity to promote the potential successes of globalization and sustainable development. To

12

Gargen, 147.
Lorraine Elliott, "ASEAN and Environmental Governance: Strategies of Regionalism in Southeast Asia," Global
Environmental Politics 12, no. 3 (2012), doi:10.1162/glep_a_00122.
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ASEAN elites who have long felt overlooked on the international stage, this has been a welcome
proposition as they have grown wealthy and begun to be included in the conversation amongst
global elites.
The elites and new consumer class in ASEAN are mainly an urban elite. They can take
advantage of their position in the global marketplace due to low wages and highly specialized
workforces in their countries. Vietnam for example is the country where wealth grew the fastest
worldwide over the last ten years with 210% growth.14 In Cambodia and Laos we can see the same
thing. 1516 Yet as wealth is generated and GDP grows, the wealth largely remains trapped at the
upper echelons of society. For the largely educated and largely male urban consumer class, this
growth has been rapid. It affords them opportunities to rise from the middle class to the upper class
of society. The formerly wealthy now occupy a new strata in society. These super high net worth
individuals now exercise extreme influence in government and culture as they are the ones who
have the capital to support or derail new projects, politicians and ventures. For them, having a
united ASEAN provides them with a larger market to grow their wealth. On November 22, 2015
their hopes were fulfilled as the ten ASEAN countries formally became a global business hub.
Overnight, the 622 million ASEAN citizens became the third-largest labor force in the
world (after China and India) as ASEAN became a single linked economic community.17
Economists around the world reached consensus in seeing ASEAN as the pivotal world market for

Sally French, "Wealth in This Asian Country Grew by 210% in the Last 10 Years -- and It’s Not China,"
Marketwatch January 29, 2018, https://www.marketwatch.com/story/wealth-in-this-asian-country-grew-by-210-inthe-last-10-years----and-its-not-china-2018-01-29.
15
Essarayos Mean, "Inequality a Defining Challenge for the World, and for Cambodia," VOA Khmer September 24,
2015, https://www.voacambodia.com/a/inequality-a-defining-challenge-for-th-world-and-forcambodia/2976794.html.
16
"Growth Cuts Absolute Poverty, but Inequality Rising in Lao PDR – ADB Study," Asian Development Bank,
February 06, 2018, https://www.adb.org/news/growth-cuts-absolute-poverty-inequality-rising-lao-pdr-adb-study.
17
"ASEAN Economic Community," ASEAN | One Vision, One Identity, One Community, http://asean.org/aseaneconomic-community/.
14
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the next decades. Within ASEAN, it is the countries along the Mekong that have the highest growth
potential. Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar all had average GDP growth above six percent
per year over the last ten years and are in the top twenty worldwide each year.18 Measured solely
on economic growth, the ASEAN is a glowing success. For the rising urban class that makes up
the new consumer core within these countries, this is also welcome news as their riches grow and
they enter the global middle and upper class.
What these economists and prognosticators fail to consider in talking about the rise of the
ASEAN’s economies is the environmental degradation attached to this growth.19 For example, a
2013 analysis by the International Energy Agency predicted that if Southeast Asia maintained its
current growth rate, mainland Southeast Asia alone would demand an increase in electricity of
80% over the next twenty years.20 This would perhaps be possible if energy demands in the exact
same region had not expanded by 250% over the previous twenty years.21 By being the hot
commodity on the world stage, these countries are poised to meet economic targets that will enrich
their urban elites and develop and modernize their urban cores. With these projections though, the
impetus becomes clear—economic growth is the main priority as Southeast Asia develops, all else,
including social and environmental impacts, will take a backseat.
Unfortunately, this framework of growth above all else is the exact one that has created the
global climate crisis. Since the industrial revolution began, 2,000 billion tons of CO2 have been
emitted into the atmosphere, as the world has transitioned to an industrial globalized economy. To

18

"GDP Growth (annual %)," World Bank Data, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG.
Venkatachalam Anbumozhi and Ponciano S. Intal, Jr., Can Thinking Green and Sustainability Be an Economic
Opportunity for ASEAN? report, ERIA Discussion Paper Series (ERIA, 2015), http://www.eria.org/publications/canthinking-green-and-sustainability-be-an-economic-opportunity-for-asean/.
20
World Energy Outlook Special Report 2013: Southeast Asia Energy Outlook, publication (International Energy
Association, 2013), https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/weo-2013-special-reportsoutheast-asia-energy-outlook.html.
21
Ibid.
19
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keep with the Paris Climate Agreement targets, and only warm the planet by two degrees Celsius
total, the world has until 2040 at which point its current trajectory would emit another 1,000 billion
tons of CO2.22 This would be calamitous, and unfortunately nothing within the current framework
will stop it. Capitalism’s grow or die mantra seeks continued expansion beyond tangible
limitations in a world where all reputable science says that carbon emissions must be limited, cut,
and capped. In Southeast Asia, this is clearly seen by placing the demand for increased economic
and electrical output above all else in society. While Southeast Asians collectively did little to
create this climate crisis, the model of development that they are following today is directly
responsible for it. By using the same model, the problems associated to anthropogenic climate
change will only grow as negative effects become further exacerbated. If all countries followed
this development model, the timeline for countering climate change will only continue to shrink.
As Elizabeth Kolbert documents in The Sixth Extinction, due to industrial capital, humans have
ushered in the age of the Anthropocene—or the sixth mass extinction of biodiversity from the
world. In the next fifty years, the earth will see a loss of biodiversity at unprecedented rates
including the depletion of entire fish populations. The deleterious effects of fossil-fueled
capitalism has plunged the entire planet into crisis. By not countering the growth model, problems
only compound.
This will be particularly disastrous along the Mekong. Two-thirds of people in the Mekong
River Basin continue to live in rural areas that are reliant solely on subsistence fishing for their
diet.23 As one of the most biodiverse places in the world, the negative effects will be augmented
on the Mekong as species will go extinct quicker and the overall ecosystem will drastically change.

22

Elizabeth Kolbert, The Sixth Extinction an Unnatural History (New York: Picador, Henry Holt and Company,
2015).
23
State of the Basin Report 2010 (Vientiane: Mekong River Commission, 2010).
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People who live off of the river for subsistence are not the people responsible for climate change
yet climate change directly effects them first. Climate change makes the likelihood of flooding,
drought, and heat stroke more drastic. These are unnatural changes that leave people like the
indigenous ecosystem people in Ratanikiri, at the greatest risk.
Throughout ASEAN we can see this environmental risk firsthand. According to the 2018
Global Climate Risk Index “survey of the last twenty years,” ASEAN countries comprise four of
the top nine most vulnerable countries to climate change in the world.24 Three of these countries,
Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam, are located directly on the Mekong. Typhoons, droughts and
floods are becoming yearly occurrences without any chances of slowing down in Southeast Asia.
Despite this, at the top levels of society and government, the effects of climate change do not
register as something entangled within the growth paradigm. Elites and the governments of these
countries can speak of crisis, however, they are speaking of environmental problems as crisis
specifically through the lens of lost profit and material wealth. As they continue to argue over
measures, natural disasters only become more frequent as the growth model continues its assault
on the earth. These are real problems that put the livelihood of real people in flux as the Mekong
is viewed as an opportunity for further development.
Instead of seeing the Mekong’s relatively untouched waters as an opportunity for global
preservation and resilience, the Mekong is seen as an engine of economic development. These
countries see the Mekong solely for its hydroelectric potential. This could be partly attributed to
the countries on the Mekong not taking part in the globalized market economy until later than
many of the western countries and feeling the desire to grow and join the global marketplace as
quickly as possible.

24

David Eckstein, Vera Künzel, and Laura Schäfer, Global Climate Risk Index 2018, report (Bonn: GermanWatch,
2017), , https://germanwatch.org/en/download/20432.pdf.
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How Damming Came to the Mekong
In 1979, China enacted its market reforms. Vietnam and Laos followed by entering the
global market economy in the mid-1980s and Cambodia in the mid-1990s. During the mid and late
1990s, all the countries on the Mekong realized they had an exploitable natural resource on their
hands with the untouched river. Once damming became the du jour development model of the
World Bank, IMF, and USAID, the Mekong Countries rushed to take part in the development race,
seeing the river as their untapped resource. The international development agencies liked damming
because not only did it create jobs and open new industrial avenues, but hydroelectric energy was
seen as a sustainable alternative to fossil fuels. With dams, aid organizations could showcase
largescale development projects while tying them to economic reforms opening up domestic
markets to international finance. Whereas before dam projects, subsistence agriculture may have
reigned supreme, after damming, largescale private agricultural industries could now dominate the
new market. Domestically dating back to Roosevelt with the Hoover Dam, and Nehru with the
Bhakra-Nangal, dams have signified “greatness, power, and domination” as they are icons of
economic and scientific progress.25 Historically dams and dam building are prideful nationalistic
activities that project advanced development by showcasing the might of a country’s scientific
proclivities.
China became the first country to move full steam ahead with dam building projects in the
latter half of the twentieth century. They opened the first dam on the Mekong in 1986 at Manwan,
but it was on another of China’s major rivers, the Yangtze, that they chose to target their largest
damming operations.26 The Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River was initially approved in
1992 and wasn’t opened until 2003. The dam is the largest in the world and cost a total of $24

25
26

McCully, 3.
Gargen, 95.
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billion to construct. By 2008, even the Chinese Government was ready to acknowledge the
negative environmental implications of the gargantuan dam. In the first five years of its opening,
it was largely connected to landslides and radically altered the ecosystems surrounding it.
Additionally, over a million people were displaced simply to build the dam. These people had to
leave their homes and communities behind to relocate.27 The negative effects of the Three Gorges
Dam should have served as a wake-up call for all who promoted dams as a sustainable development
option.
Unfortunately, in the period when China was building the Three Gorges dam there weren’t
many dissenting voices making this claim aside from Patrick McCully. In his book Silenced Rivers,
McCully argues against the idea of dams as a positive form of development. He argued that:
“The damming of the world has brought a profound change to watersheds, nothing
alters a river as totally as a dam. A reservoir is the antithesis of a river—the essence of a
river is that it flows, the essence of a reservoir is that it is still. A wild river is dynamic,
forever changing—eroding its bed, depositing silt, seeking a new course, bursting its banks,
drying up. A dam is monumentally static; it tries to bring a river under control, to regulate
its seasonal pattern of floods and low flows. A dam traps sediments and nutrients, alters
the river’s temperature and chemistry, and upsets the geological processes of erosion and
deposition through which the river sculpts the surrounding land.”28
What McCully argues is that any damming will have effects far beyond the energy production
created or the specific location the dam is placed. McCully takes a full scale view at the problem
and notes that for an ecosystem as large and varied as the Mekong River or Yangtze, it is

27

Mara Hvistendahl, "China's Three Gorges Dam: An Environmental Catastrophe?" Scientific American, March 25,
2008, accessed March 31, 2018, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/chinas-three-gorges-dam-disaster/.
28
McCully, 10.
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imperative to view the river as a whole rather than segmenting it. With a resource as large and
powerful as the Mekong, if there is going to be any form of development along it, there needs to
be a set of agreements to monitor and oversee the impact this development has on the river and its
vast ecosystem.
In writing about managing large and disparate populations Veronica Ward explains, “To
manage an ecosystem, or utilize ecosystem principles, however, as with a sovereign state,
boundaries must be known; managers and policymakers must be able to identify and agree upon
the entity to be conserved.”29 While the Mekong can delineate boundaries of nation states, in order
to manage the Mekong, and especially its development, Ward’s framework thinks the best way is
through the state sovereignty system. In her research, Ward uses examples such as Antarctica to
prove that nations can come together to conserve ecosystems. As Ward notes, “it was the specific
configuration of interests in the Antarctic, along with the acknowledgement of potentially negative
environmental and economic consequences, which resulted in the establishment of this ecosystem
management regime.”30 Unfortunately, in the rush to develop Southeast Asia and specifically the
Mekong, no ecosystem management regime was set in place. In Southeast Asia, there were only
eager regimes that viewed the Mekong solely for its economic development. Through this
perspective, the negative environmental consequences were far outweighed by the supposed
economic gains, and thus damming commenced.

29

Veronica Ward, The Greening of Sovereignty in World Politics, ed. Karen Litfin (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1998), 84.
30
Ward, 98.
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Failures of the Mekong River Commission
The Mekong River Commission (MRC), the board created to oversee the development on
the Mekong, further illustrates the inadequacies of the state sovereignty system of ecosystem
management. The MRC governs the allocation and utilization of the Mekong River by the four
countries in the Mekong River Basin—Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. The MRC was
founded through the 1995 Treaty on Cooperation for Sustainable Development in the Mekong
River Basin. The output of the development race in the mid-1990s created the MRC as an
independent international body separate from ASEAN. Although the Mekong also flows through
China and Myanmar, the two countries that make up the Upper Mekong Basin,31 the MRC only
includes the four lower Mekong countries, yet includes Myanmar and China as official dialogue
partners. The MRC was created with the specific intention of governing and allocating sustainable
development along the Mekong.
In 2003, the MRC adopted a notice stating that “if a country is to build hydropower dams
on a Mekong tributary, it must notify the Joint Committee of the MRC.” In addition to notifying
the MRC, Article 7 of the initial MRC agreement says, “When one or more states is notified with
proper and valid evidence that it is causing substantial damage to one or more riparian from the
use of and/or discharge to water of the Mekong River, that State or States shall cease immediately
the alleged cause of harm.”32 Despite this feedback mechanism, the problem with Article 7 is that
its threshold remains completely arbitrary. As Simon Benedikter says, “The sheer size of the Delta,
its complexity, ecological dynamics, and growing human interference have made it almost

31

Tibet is represented by China in this form.
Mekong River Commission, Mekong River Commission for Sustainable Development (Phnom Penh: MRC),
Article 7.
32
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impossible to predict how nature will respond to any modification of the landscape.”33 This means
that the Lower Mekong Delta in Vietnam would surely be negatively impacted by any dams built
higher up on the Mekong in Laos, Cambodia, or China, however the actual direct level of impact
can never be quantified. Since it remains arbitrary, countries are free to essentially ignore the
ruling. Additionally, Article 7 falls woefully short of a much needed veto clause which would
allow other member countries to vote against a potentially harmful development. By maintaining
a malleable threshold, the limits will be challenged and thus the legitimacy of an international body
like the MRC remains under stress. This was seen in 2013, when Laos’ Director General for the
Department of Energy Policy and Planning, Daovong Phonekeo, stated, “For the development of
the Mekong River, we don’t need consensus.” With this, Phonekeo articulated the weakness of the
entire MRC and state sovereignty system not being tied to specific binding agreements.
Agreeing with the point from Benedikter, McCully also argues that all dams and barrages
change the flow of rivers. Since rivers span large distances, they are parts of a larger ecological
system beyond the local environment where a dam may be placed. As an example, anything that
occurs upstream on the Mekong in China, Myanmar or Laos will certainly have an effect on
downstream fish migrations in Cambodia and Vietnam. If a river is cut off and turned into a
reservoir this can disrupt sediment transfer, fertilization of agriculture on the riparian edges, and
changes to the fish stocks. McCully would argue that by putting any barrage or dam up, the course
of a river inherently begins an unnatural processes which must be seen as ‘substantial damage’
since it transforms the entire ecosystem. However, in the context of the MRC and sustainable
development, the definition of substantial change is drastically different. Substantial change means
limiting future profit or ability to dam in the future.
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If utilized to its full potential, the MRC is supposed to be a safeguard for protection and
sustainable development of the river within the region that contains the world’s largest inland
fishery. However, by having an additional political body apart from the ASEAN and the U.N.’s
Mekong Committee, the MRC has failed to adequately manage the trans-boundary water issue.
Additionally, institutional cooperation and partnership between ASEAN and the MRC has
remained weak due to a lack of political will and resource mobilization from both institutions.34
Even if there were cohesion and understanding between ASEAN and the MRC, there would still
be the issue of balancing domestic concerns with international consensus. To demonstrate how
this can go wrong, there is no better example than the 2010 meeting of the MRC.
The ICEM Report
In 2009, the MRC commissioned ICEM (International Centre for Environmental
Management) to produce a Strategic Environmental Assessment on the future of hydropower along
the Mekong River. The ICEM report was researched over 2009 and 2010 and created for
presentation at the 2010 meeting of the MRC. It sought to serve as a guiding principle for the future
of development along the Mekong. The MRC commissioned the report because it viewed
development of hydropower on the mainstream Mekong as one of the most important strategic
issues facing the Lower Mekong Region. At the time of the report, the Mekong River was known
internationally as one of the last large rivers on Earth not dammed for most of its length, as well
as the only river which flowed uninhibited through Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and
Vietnam. With this, developers saw opportunity. The MRC wanted to make sure this was safe, so
they contracted the Australian ICEM to do the major regional environmental impact report.
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Figure 2. Map of the twelve proposed mainstream Mekong dams analyzed by ICEM 35

ICEM’s final report analyzed the twelve submitted hydropower projects on the Lower
Mekong Basin. Part of the structural problem with a supranational governing body such as the
MRC, is that each member country must also contend with their own domestic plans. Sometimes
domestic policies will directly conflict with their diplomatic or regional development efforts.36 For
example, at the time of the report, Laos, had embarked on a grand project to place dozens of its
own hydroelectric dams along the Mekong in an effort to become the battery of Southeast Asia.
The report stated that “without mainstream hydropower, Laos had sufficient hydropower potential
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on Mekong tributaries in the medium term, to continue generating healthy export earnings and
encourage investment into its dynamic economy.”37 Therefore, ICEM’s findings showed that any
further damming and especially mainstream damming of the Mekong in Laos would overextend
and push the river beyond a sustainable use. The Laotian effort to become the battery of Southeast
Asia is a modernization and development strategy which is predicated on short-term growth via
dam building in which Laos would then export most of the hydroelectric energy to other countries.
For a country where 85% of the population is employed in the agricultural sector, but only 6.6%
of their land is arable, this provides Laos an economic development model that could provide
wealth gains for its citizens.38
However, this reliance on growth would have catastrophic effects on livelihoods
throughout the Mekong. The ICEM report went to great efforts to demonstrate this. If all twelve
mainstream dams proposed were completed by 2030, as projected, the annual amount of protein
lost due to the creation of these dams would represent 110% of the 2009 total of annual livestock
produced in Cambodia and Laos combined. The Mekong River would be radically altered as 55%
of the river would be converted into reservoirs. The subsistence agriculture and fishing techniques
relied upon by so many would be absolutely devastated and the altered terrain would drastically
transform the physical landscapes of these countries. Thirty million people live and work within
fifteen kilometers of the Mekong in the Lower Basin. These people’s lives and their relationship
to the river would be forever changed.39 This would essentially be a contemporary land grab of the
highest degree. As Borras et al. suggested, this proposed transformation of land should be seen “as
capital’s response to the convergence of food, energy and financial crises, climate change
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mitigation imperatives, and demands for resources from newer hubs of global capital.”40 With this
land grab, all the power would be sent to urban areas while leaving a large rural portion of these
countries’ populations ever more precarious.

The Urban-Rural Divide
Unfortunately, the population most harmed would be the most vulnerable in society, the
ones with the least political voice—the rural population. Land grabs such as these upend those
who make a living from the land (more than 52% of the world’s population), while simultaneously
depleting resources as land grabs promote extractive industries.41 The ICEM report went on to
state, that the “benefits of hydropower would accrue to electricity consumers using national grids,
developers, financiers, whereas most costs would be borne by poor and vulnerable riparian
communities.”42 The economic benefit coming from the sale and development of electricity would
exacerbate problems for the livelihood of the 80% of Mekong basin residents reliant on the river.
In Cambodia, where only 31% of society has electricity, and flood protection is minimal, this tradeoff favoring the lives of urbanites, comes directly at the expense of, and greater exposure to risk
for, the rural residents.43
While harming rural residents, the brunt of the burden is placed upon rural women. In
Ratanakiri we can see this clearly. Young Park and Maffii argue that in the land grab in Cambodia,
not only are women “losing the material and symbolic places of recognition that they had, but also
their identities as farmers and agriculturalists, while being re-framed essentially as care providers
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according to mainstream gender roles.”44 These new roles not only take away their equal footing
as farmers or agriculturalists within their indigenous societies, but also recast them as the most
vulnerable group within mainstream society. In 2016 alone, one third of all Khmer television
programs on the five national stations in Cambodia depicted some form of violence against
women, whether physical, sexual, or emotional abuse.45 The process of being integrated in the
homogenized, mainstream society for these rural women upends millennia of traditions and
customs that matrilineal and matrilocal ethnic groups like the Jarai and Tampouan have, while
subverting and subjecting those same women to a global capitalist patriarchal system.46
These land grabs also highlight the nature of how the state sovereignty system creates
competition and exploitation between countries in collaboration on other agreements. Thai,
Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, Malaysian and Singaporean investors lead the efforts for damming
along the Mekong.47 Thailand started buying electricity from Laos in 1998 and sees their
investments in the dams as surefire investments with low cost hydroelectric energy exported to
them at a fixed cost as a guaranteed return.48 China supports the investments in Southeast Asia as
a way of gaining greater geopolitical influence.49 By providing loans with fewer restrictions than
the World Bank, they are able to gain favor with the Southeast Asian countries. Additionally, by
being the most upstream on the Mekong, they strengthen their strategic positioning as they can
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control the flow of the river making the downstream countries dependent on them. Furthermore,
with these dams, it is not Cambodian and Laotian companies or governments that are accruing
profits from the damming, it is the investors in other ASEAN countries, as well as elites in local
society. Using the advantages of the linked ASEAN marketplace, these other countries see prime
opportunity in their underdeveloped neighbors to receive heavily sought after government and
multinational contracts. The elites in Laos and Cambodia use this as their opportunity to increase
their standard of living as well. This boosts them into the global upper class and with it brings
along a lifestyle based upon consumption. This internal and external inequality can be seen as
“twenty percent of the world’s population is responsible for 63% of emissions, while the bottom
20% of the world’s people are releasing only 3%.”50 Transforming the rural in order to power the
urban, fuels the actions of the wealthy to further accelerate climate change and exacerbate
inequalities.
In the inland Cambodian and Vietnamese portions of the basin, over one million tons of
freshwater fish are caught each year and over 70% of the protein consumed in the region comes
from fish.51 The Mekong Plume, the spillway where the Mekong exits into the South China Sea
off the coast of Vietnam, is one of the top ocean fishery sites in the world which provide an
additional half million tons of fish caught per year.52 Not only is Southeast Asia reliant on this
protein source, but one quarter of the world’s consumed fish are caught in Southeast Asia and one
fifth of the world’s rice crop is grown in the Vietnamese portion of the delta, meaning the
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Mekong’s impact stretches far beyond Southeast Asia.53 All of these food issues would be placed
in jeopardy with any transition of the river, yet the quest for short-term profits seems to be winning
over food sovereignty in the region. Rural residents do not have the same level of safety as the
elites though. They are completely reliant on the health of their life source—the Mekong.
Perhaps if damming on the Mekong river would allow for these countries to meet the 80%
electric growth that the region projects requiring over the next twenty years, damming the main
stream of the Mekong would be a difficult but necessary trade-off in an effort to lift people out of
poverty and alleviate some of the hardships for all citizens in society. Perhaps then it could be
acceptable to damage the future livelihoods of others in a difficult trade-off that governments
would feel compelled to make. Sadly, the projected economic benefit from this preventable
planned ecological destruction is for minimal incremental change. These dams are projected to
meet only six to eight percent of the anticipated energy needs by 2025. Further analysis shows that
investment in solar or other renewable energies such as cogeneration could create even more power
for less cost, but since these technologies are in their early stages, they have been overwhelmed by
the allure of hydropower on the Laotian and Cambodian governments. 54 The desire for growth,
even minimal growth of six to eight percent has superseded millennia of history utilizing the
Mekong sustainably. This puts the livelihood of future generations in an increasingly precarious
position.
This precarious future is endemic of the one size fits all development model promoted by
international institutions like the UN, IMF and the World Bank. Ecological concerns are demoted
in order to promote market liberalization and short term economic concerns which then create
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untenable and unsalvageable negative long term effects. The ICEM report clearly states going
forward that any hydroelectric projects on the Mekong would degrade the overall ecosystem. It
says, “The proposed mainstream hydropower represents a fundamental break from the current
dynamic equilibrium of the Mekong River which converts immense potential and kinetic energy
into a wide range of eco-morphological processes along its entire length.”55 By fragmenting
aspects of the river ecosystem, the entire systemic equilibrium is disrupted and populations are left
isolated or cut off whether it be human or nonhuman species.56 Focusing specifically on this, John
Vidal, an environmental editor for the Guardian says:
“Not only is forest and farmland usually lost, but people must be evicted, and
experience shows that dams can destroy fisheries, scour riverbeds, cause more erosion, and
dramatically change the amount of silt and sediment transported downstream. While trying
to solve the one problem of climate change, there are real fears that hydropower on the
Mekong and its tributaries could make countries more prone to the floods and droughts
which climate change will bring.”57
While renewable energy is created by the hydroelectric plants, the flow of the Mekong is
drastically altered. Even before climate change is taken into account, by adding these hydroelectric
plants to the Mekong, the changes in the river’s flow will already cause instability. Mark Goichot,
a hydrologist working with WWF in Vietnam says, “The result is the delta is shrinking and sinking.
If all the dams are built it will be like someone sawing off the branch on which he is sitting. The
dams in Laos and Cambodia will have a catastrophic effect. Never have I seen a delta move from
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stability to this level of stress in so short a time.”58 Unfortunately, these hydroelectric dams also
disproportionately affect the people most vulnerable—the fifty million or so people who rely on
the river for subsistence fishing.
The Nam Thuen 2 (NT2) Hydropower Project in Central Laos is a microcosm of all these
fears and challenges. Originally proposed in the late 1980s, it didn’t receive financing until 2005
when the World Bank agreed to provide financial guarantees. The dam was completed in 2010 and
a 2014 report confirmed all the worst fears of the negatives associated with these dam projects to
be true. Ian Baird and Keith Barney analyzed the impact of this dam and found dramatic changes
in the hydrology and water quality on the Mekong due to the NT2 hydropower plant. Additionally,
they proved that the World Bank failed to adequately mitigate downstream impact or sufficiently
compensate the affected peoples of the dam.59 McCully in his excoriation of dams would
consistently harp on one key point—timetable. For impact and potential negative effects of dams,
the timetables are always shorter than the true long term impact of the dams. As rivers have
developed and changed courses naturally over millennia, five-year, ten-year, or even twenty-year
impact studies are woefully inadequate to the scale of the changes being made over the course of
history.60 Luckily the NT2 plant is only located on a tributary of the Mekong, the Nam Thuen
River, but the results of the NT2 plant clearly indicate even when thirty years of planning goes
into any of these dam proposals, the overall deleterious effects on people’s livelihoods and river
quality are overlooked in the pursuit of economic development.
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Ignoring ICEM’s Findings
Overall, the ICEM report concluded by issuing a strong rebuke to the development model
along the Mekong. Whereas the MRC considered the development of hydropower on the Mekong
Mainstream one of the most important strategic issues facing the Lower Mekong region, they were
not prepared for ICEM’s findings. ICEM strongly recommended deferral of any dam building or
any decisions on the Mekong for a period of ten years, with reviews every three years in order to
ensure the safety of the river. Despite the recommendation submitted to the MRC, the MRC’s lack
of influence was highlighted when Laos simply decided to ignore the study and pressed on with
construction of new hydroelectric dams on the Mekong mainstream. As seen before, without a
feedback mechanism to stop development along the Mekong and specifically the ineffectiveness
of Article 7 of the Mekong River Commission charter, it comes as no surprise that when one
country ignores the ruling, the entire rule-based system of governance lacks credibility to enforce
others from following their lead.
To further complicate matters, in 2015, China initiated a new cross-border sovereignty
exercise with the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Mechanism. The LMC further adds to the
impotence of the MRC because it now competes against the MRC. The LMC is hosted by the
Chinese and includes all five other countries the Mekong flows through. In January 2018, the LMC
countries came up with a new five-year plan for cooperation along the Mekong. The actual plan
the delegates agreed to is so vague there doesn’t seem to be any clear target or agreement other
than a desire for increased collaboration. To emphasize this, the plan intentionally sidesteps the
question of dam building. It provides no concrete objectives or steps to address the threats to the
Mekong, it only seems to encourage greater cooperation.61 Furthermore, it does nothing to
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challenge the growth model and only continues to convene talks about the problem while
presenting and creating only artificial solutions that do not challenge the fundamental root cause.
By doing this, China not only undermines the ability of the MRC, but makes solutions through the
state sovereignty system along the Mekong even more unlikely.

Problems with the System
By looking at the limitations of the Paris Climate Agreement, we can see this as not solely
a Southeast Asian problem, but rather as indicative of the greater flaw of the international system.
The Paris Climate Agreement was written and drafted in late 2015 at the same time that ASEAN
became an integrated community. The agreement sought to limit the threat of climate change
globally by less than two degrees Celsius over the course of this century. The agreement was
signed by 195 countries and signaled a leap forward in climate diplomacy. Less than three years
later, we already see the limiting factors that plagued the MRC also plaguing the Paris Climate
Agreement. After the first two years of reports, not even one industrialized country is on track to
meet the stated goals of this agreement.62 Only Gambia and Morocco of the 195 countries are on
track to meet the 1.5 degree target and only five additional countries are on pace to meet the 2
degree target set out by the Copenhagen conference in 2009. Like the MRC, The Paris Climate
Agreement lacks a feedback mechanism to overcome its voluntary buy-ins and targets. As seen
with the MRC, when a state chooses between self-monitoring or limiting growth, they always
choose growth.
Without a global accountability mechanism, the state sovereignty model leads to every
country fighting for their own best interest in the short term over long term cross-border
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collaboration. Additionally, without consequences for these actions, these agreements only
continue to talk about the problem rather than addressing a solution. On the Mekong, this pits
countries against one another in a race to the bottom, as demonstrated by Laos ignoring the ICEM
report. Directly after Laos decided to go against the proposed moratorium on dams, Cambodia
began ramping up its attempts at implementing hydroelectric dams on the river almost
instantaneously so they wouldn’t be left behind. While an agreement can be reached, all it takes is
one actor to ignore the ruling in order for the whole diplomatic effort to be entirely futile. In this
case, without having a veto in the MRC, the agreement was damned from the beginning.
An example of how this is playing out in Cambodia can be found about six hours north of
Kampong Cham in Khoum Kbal Romeas, where Cambodia initiated the start of the Lower Sesan
2 Dam in 2014. This dam is set to be completed in 2018 and will help double Cambodia’s
electricity generation according to the Cambodian Government.63 Yet despite doubling electric
generation, if completed, this dam can lead to a 9.3% decline in fish biomass throughout the whole
river basin.64 Additionally, for this to happen, mass migration of people will need to occur as
indigenous tribes will have to be relocated off of native lands. This will not only displace the
70,000 people located nearby, but also displace generations of TEK the local villagers have in that
specific stretch of the river.65 In Cambodia, this drastic shift is a top-down approach mandating
that the electricity can be taken to the urban cores of Phnom Penh, Siem Reap and Kampong Cham.
Killing off nearly 10% of the entire fish biomass in the basin will have catastrophic effects as far
as the Tonle Sap. The Tonle Sap is the largest freshwater lake in Southeast Asia and is the major
food supply for much of Cambodia and the region. While Cambodia lacks energy infrastructure,
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by harming its current and future food supply, it is bargaining away food security for increased
electrical development.
Following the normal narrative of environmental injustice, this is another example where,
“the places and communities that suffer the costs of production most directly receive a much
smaller share of its benefits.”66 This can be seen as a brutal race to the bottom which accelerates
exhaustion of the resources of the Mekong. With China seeing Laos and Cambodia building dams
and realizing since it is further up the river, it too can dam the Mekong. This model of development
focuses on urban development over rural livelihoods in Southeast Asia. As long as this remains,
the ecological sustainability of the Mekong River remains wholly precarious.
The country furthest downriver, Vietnam, shoulders the largest burden of the effects placed
upon them by the other six countries upstream simply by being downstream. The Mekong River
basin in Southern Vietnam is almost the exact size of Netherlands and due to climate change is
almost like the Netherlands—under water. The delta has historically been Vietnam’s rice basket.
Southern Vietnam was the Vietnamese home to much of the “Green Revolution” in the region. As
Vietnam adapted to the Green Revolution, they limited the strains and varieties of crops, grains,
and rice going into the ground. Prior to the Green Revolution there were many strains of “organic”
and “wild” rice grown in Southern Vietnam. While some of the previous strains of rice could grow
with salt water or adapt by adhering to the policies of the Green Revolution and prioritizing growth,
Vietnam became reliant on a “miracle” strain of rice. Unfortunately, the miracle strain turned out
not to be as resilient as the organic and traditional strains of rice. Since it was created in a lab rather
than undergoing the natural transformations over tens of thousands of years, the strain was only as
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resilient as the scientists who created it perceived it needed to be. In the age of climate change,
this shortsightedness and unpreparedness for changing ecosystems may prove catastrophic.
Sea-level rise due to climate change makes farmers in Southern Vietnam more vulnerable
each year as the rice cannot adapt, leaving farmers no choice but to find new professions.67 This
saltwater seeps into the crops and kills entire harvests of rice, as the rice cannot grow in the
seawater. Now that dams higher up the Mekong continue to be implemented, farmers and fisher
people alike in Southern Vietnam face the brunt of weaker harvests and harder work, compounding
the issues associated with sea-level rise. What the farmers and fisher people are told to do is leave
behind their livelihoods and transform to the new economy of the twenty-first century by moving
to one of the two largest cities in Southern Vietnam— Can Tho and Ho Chi Minh City—and taking
part in the industrialized urban life. This is the governmental solution for climate change: adapt
and become part of the only potential vison for the twenty-first century economy—the urban
economy.

The Global City Discourse
The first decade of the twenty-first century dawned a new generation of urbanists. The
United Nations reported that for the first time in human history, more people lived in cities around
the world than didn’t.68 Another UN report said that by 2050, two thirds of the world’s population
was set to live in cities.69 In 2008, the Rockefeller Foundation published “The Century of the City:
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No Time to Lose.” This report stated that the twenty-first century will be defined by mass and
rapid urbanization. The report was the output of a month-long seminar at the Bellagio Center in
Italy entitled, “Global Urban Summit” which hosted government officials, finance experts, urban
researchers, and other innovators.70 At the time of publication, the world was entering the 2008
financial crisis, but to the writers of this report, economic malaise was not a thing that couldn’t be
overcome through the power of urban entrepreneurship. Cities needed to quickly modernize, and
the idea of the smart city began as cities raced to become the most efficient in the world.
The idea of the global city expanded upon the homogenization project that is globalization.
The theorists and practitioners that the Rockefeller Foundation brought together exalt the
innovation and ingenuity found in cities by consistently pitting the urban against the rural. Here
the western biases of what can constitute a global vision shines through as the idea of anything
global for many of these theorists can simply be defined as western and urban centric. For example,
A.T. Kearney, a leading international global management consultancy has been compiling reports
on global cities since 2008. The 2017 report which is its seventh iteration, ranks cities based upon
their business activity, human capital, information exchange, cultural experience and political
engagement. Utilizing these categories that define the leading global cities, Kearney finds that of
their top 25 global cities, six are located in the United States, eight are located in the European
Union, while none at all are located in Africa or South America. Boston and Vienna are included
on the list while Bangkok, Mumbai, Delhi, Dakar, Sao Paolo and Jakarta are not.71 Kearney’s view
of a global city is one in direct opposition to what is needed to combat the negative effects of
climate change. Rather than promoting a diverse range of options, only a homogenized western
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view of a global city is promoted. As the promoters of the global city continue to extol the virtues
of the city, they really extol the characteristics of cities that make them western. To expand, their
framework of a global city must change to meet the actual challenges facing cities.
By looking at a city like Can Tho, Vietnam we see what this would look like. In this
framework, there would be a larger network of cities facing similar challenges and through
collaboration they could solve these challenges collectively. Can Tho, with a population of 1.4
million people is the second largest city on the Mekong. It is the industrial port at the end of the
river. Due solely to geography, Can Tho is largely dependent on upstream actions and actors.
Agriculture around Can Tho is vulnerable to sea-level rise and a lack of diverse rice crops found
in the delta. The way that the global city has been co-opted doesn’t allow for Can Tho to connect
with these other cities on the Mekong, but instead tries to connect them to global financing. It
leaves this stone unturned as instead of collaboration with the other cities on the Mekong, localized
mitigation efforts in Can Tho alone are supposed to create the changes needed to overcome climate
change. These individual actions are heavily funded and supported by the west but offer no tangible
solutions outside of lining the pockets of the western investors. For the citizens of the Mekong,
resilience cannot be building to bounce back to the current system as it is already set on a path
towards destruction of their ecosystem. When floods and droughts devastate the region, building
to reclaim what is already consistently failing is surefire way to ensure continued future failures.

The Resilient City
By 2013, the moniker “global city” had transformed into the “resilient global city” as the
Rockefeller Foundation created a list of the 100 Resilient Cities. As Ashley Dawson states in his
book Extreme Cities, “Resilience is consequently an opportune lens for elites to adopt in coping

31

with the extreme city. Instead of questioning and contesting the manufactured insecurities of the
extreme city, resilience discourse tends to shunt the responsibility to adapt to hazard onto
individuals.”72 It should be no surprise that Can Tho, is included in the list of the 100 Resilient
Cities. The description of Can Tho on the 100 Resilient Cities website says, “Seasonal floods can
last for several weeks, leading to a drop in productivity as workers cannot reach their jobs and
students cannot attend school. Can Tho is looking to implement creative medium-term solutions
including infrastructure upgrades to safeguard the city’s power, water and transportation
infrastructures.” Just as Dawson described earlier, none of the resiliency framework here is applied
to upending or even addressing root cause of the problem. When the only conversation about Can
Tho is an individualized conversation about mitigation efforts and what can work on a micro scale
rather than looking at a larger system scale, the solutions can only offer partial answers, as they
will continue to constantly require adaptation to their neighbors’ actions.
For certain areas in Southeast Asia, the conception of developing in a similar fashion to
how New York City or other western cities developed is not an option. Places like Can Tho would
be under water before they would even be able to build as such. As Le Anh Tuan, a researcher
from Can Tho University in Vietnam says, “If sea levels rise one meter, 20% of the delta is
affected. If two meters, it is too dreadful to contemplate. Half the delta will be lost and threequarters of the 20 million people will be severely affected.” Despite calls to modernize into the
global and resilient city coming from western leaders, places like Can Tho simply cannot afford
to follow this path. Unfortunately and paradoxically, that path is directly where external aid and
development funding exists for them.
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In March 2015, the consumer research firm Nielsen issued a report entitled “The Age of
ASEAN Cities: From Migrant Consumers to Megacities.” Nielsen, like the Rockefeller
Foundation, emphasized the need for cities to quickly adapt. Nielsen’s report set out to analyze the
next ten years in ASEAN and predict where people would live and what their consumption habits
would look like in 2025. At the time of the report, approximately 52 million ASEAN citizens lived
in megacities of over 5 million people, and an additional 35 million lived in cities of over one
million. Those numbers may sound large, but at the same time over six times as many or 330
million ASEAN citizens lived in rural areas and small towns.
In fact, rural areas and small towns constituted 52% of the overall ASEAN population in
2015. By 2025, despite anticipated mass migration and growth in cities of over 1 million people
leading to about 35 million new residents in these cities, the overall number of rural and small
town residents in ASEAN is supposed to remain 324 million by 2025, or 47% of ASEAN’s total.73
What becomes entirely clear is that the Nielsen report fails to meaningfully address that huge rural
audience. Unlike much of the rest of the world where cities are the predominant form of life,
Southeast Asia is not currently majority urban as these numbers show. The Nielsen report’s
excitement over the growth of cities in ASEAN can be read justly for that reason as companies
and businesses are Nielsen’s target audience. They need new consumers and markets they can tap
into. By generating excitement over cities in ASEAN, Nielsen promotes creation of a new market
to expand to. However, what becomes entirely clear, is that for both Nielsen and for the Rockefeller
Foundation reports, they both overlook a large portion of the population by promoting a one size
fits all western, homogenized, global city approach.
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A Counter to the Urban
This development model accelerates parallel to the increased demand for hydroelectric
power and urban industrial development. However, this model was not created with Southeast
Asia in mind and yet is being imposed upon the population of Southeast Asia. 2017 statistics show
Cambodia’s urban population at 21%, Vietnam’s at 35%, Laos’ at 41%, Thailand’s at 53%, and
Myanmar’s at 35%.74 Despite the many reports that continue to say that the future of ASEAN is
to be defined as the future of the megacity and mass urbanization, the actual numbers simply do
not bear out this reality!
Along the Mekong River we already see that this mass urbanization entails not only a
radical reshaping of the terrain and life for millions, but also a desecration of the Mekong’s
biodiverse ecosystem. The idea of urbanization as the only form of development comes directly
out of a western framework based only on processes that were implemented in the global north.
This model is based on increased and furthered capitalist development and expansion. In his essay
“Visitors to the Commons: Approaching Thailand’s ‘Environmental’ Struggles from a Western
Starting Point,” Larry Lohmann argues that much of the discourse around Thai environmental
movements has been drawn from western frameworks. This can be taken and applied also to forms
of development throughout Southeast Asia. He goes on to argue that the way Thai
environmentalism is viewed is from ways in which it can be connected to western environmental
movements.75 What is lost is the inherent value in the local environmental knowledge of the area
and whether that knowledge or ethic can be of utility in creating a future. This relates back to the
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TEK that is being erased through land grabs. These areas and ideas become as Anna Tsing calls
“Zones of Erasure.”76 What Tsing attacks is something seen over and over again around the world.
Within the homogenization project of globalized capital, ideas not promoted within elite consensus
remain outside of the realm of acceptable discourse. Hierarchies emerge and ideas from the Global
South are discarded as backwards and substandard. While these ideas may provide solutions and
fixes, they are omitted from the discourse, which remains dominated by those who have the most
hegemonic power within society.
Thinking about the damming of the Mekong in purely economic terms, it is possible to
follow the sustainable development model. However, when the effects of climate change are taken
into account, any further damming along the Mekong becomes a clearer and clearer structural
preference for urban elites over the masses of rural peoples who will have their livelihoods
upended. This can be seen by looking again at the Nielsen report. The word “climate” does not
even appear once in the entire Nielsen report and the words “environmental” and “sustainability”
each appear only one time. The word “environment” appears only in relation to consumer worries
about health and safety within these new cities. After reading this report, one is left to conclude
that the only path forward for ASEAN is the path toward greater urban development. The
environmental and climate crises are seemingly not even worth mentioning.
This, however, cannot be the case. In 2016, Southeast Asia experienced its worst drought
since 1926 as Thailand and Cambodia had their highest recorded temperatures ever. Vietnam had
to plead for China to release water from the upstream dams of the Mekong because water levels in
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Southern Vietnam were lower than they had been in a century.77 These changes to the Mekong are
already having real effects now. Vandana Shiva says that, “Diversity is the best strategy for
preventing drought and desertification. What the world needs to feed a growing population
sustainably is biodiversity intensification.”78 It would only seem to make sense then that the
biodiversity of the Mekong would be celebrated and promoted. However, by accelerating
deforestation in congruence with the damming of the Mekong, the mangroves and forests that
formerly absorbed water during floods are no longer around to do so. Cambodia, for example, once
known for lush fauna and tropical forests, may be completely deforested in the next five years if it
continues at its current pace.79 Cambodia’s primary rainforest cover fell from over 70% at the end
of the Vietnam War to just 3.1% in 2007 and continues to get worse. Between 2001 and 2016,
Cambodia has lost 22% of the total trees it had in 2000.80 If this was just in Cambodia it would be
a tragic case of domestic mismanagement. However, if the ASEAN countries continue on their
current rates of deforestation and growth, they will collectively surpass China and become the
world leader in global emissions by 2030.81 The effects of deforestation also allow for greater
flooding on the Tonle Sap Lake. This jeopardizes the protein base for the majority of the region as
fisheries become more and more vulnerable.
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Alternative Futures
The growth model along the Mekong is creating a new generation of rural people who live
in a constant state of precariousness while enriching urban elites. Therefore, it is important to seek
an alternative to the present growth model. Offering critiques is helpful, but without solutions, they
allow the growth model to continue unchecked. Even incremental changes within the growth
model do nothing to change the power structures and systems in place. These measures do not
address the underlying issue of the current global capitalist system being predicated on growth.
This alone is fundamentally unsustainable as capital recognizes no boundaries or borders, it only
creates new ones.
Each day of delaying robust climate action hastens a more limited opportunity for repairing
the breach. As Veronika Benholdt Thomsen and Maria Mies argue, capitalism “limits the time
horizon of the participants in the economy to their own lifespan. At the most it allows them to
think of the interests of their own children...creating a sustainable human society demands of us
that we care for the interests of all coming generations and of all people in the world. This is
incompatible with the spirit of capitalism.”82 While capital’s drive for growth has enriched many
and thereby defines the narrative in Southeast Asia as one of opportunity and urban prosperity,
alternatives must be proposed to challenge the Southeast Asian growth model’s newest folly—
damming the mainstream Mekong.
To embark on a new future within Southeast Asia, a new ecological framework must be
created. Elinor Ostrom is a champion of moving beyond simple answers to complex problems.83
For her, the idea that “The Commons” can be boiled down to a one-size-fits-all framework is one
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of the great disservices to our world. She takes on Garrett Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons”
and shows how if just one second tier variable is altered, the outcome of Hardin’s hypothesis would
change.84 According to Ostrom, managing a social-ecological system is a trade-off between the
interactions and outcomes of four interrelated inputs: a Resource System (RS), Resource Units
(RU), Governance System (GS), and Users (U). Resource Systems and Resource Units directly
come into interaction with Governance Systems and Users creating the equilibrium of an
ecosystem. If any one of these inputs is altered, the entire ecosystem may change. In the case of
Southeast Asia, the Mekong River Delta offers a case study for managing the social-ecological
system.
Using her framework, the Mekong River Delta (RS) and the 800,000 square kilometers
watershed (RU) comes into contact with national laws from each and every one of the six countries
the Mekong flows through or ASEAN and MRC rules (GS), affecting all seventy million people
reliant on the Mekong daily (U). Figures 3 and 4 on the next page exemplify this. As can be seen
by looking at Figure 3, any changes in second-tier variables such as human-constructed facilities
or in this case the hydroelectric dams (RS5) shift the inputs and the management away from being
a resilient system. To create a truly resilient system, these inputs and variables must be shifted in
accordance with the proper interactions and outcomes to find the appropriate governance systems.
Currently the (U) section is being overmatched as the history of use (U3) the norms (U6) and
dependency on resources (U8) are being ignored. This hinders the outcomes of resilience along
the Mekong and directly impacts the River Delta by changing the equilibrium point of the system
(RS6) through a feedback. For the Mekong to be truly socio-ecologically resilient, the norms and
history must be reclaimed as the users must have a real voice in the process.
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Figure 3. Second-tier variables in framework for analyzing an SES85

Figure 4. First-tier interactions mapped86
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To determine how to reclaim norms to ecologically sustainable practices, Melissa Lane
argues that there is a need for “a transformation of the ways in which we conceive the terms of
political and economic life.” She believes we need a new mythology, one rooted around
ecologically sustainable practice.87 To Lane, there is no way that the world can transform without
“reconsidering the basic value and meaning which we perceive.” She believes in the idea of
creating new stories and she is not alone in this vision. Many others also believe that there is no
way to make a sustainable transformation to the future without invoking a religious transformation.
Bron Taylor calls this a “Dark Green Religion.” This religion would take spiritualism from the
animist and primitivistic traditions but be post-Darwinian.88 According to Taylor, “The quest for
sustainability in a world characterized by multiple crises, most of which are exacerbated if not
precipitated by environmental decline, has the greatest chance when people remain open to
rethinking everything.”89 To rethink everything gives an opportunity for a fresh start.
However, both Lane and Taylor don’t acknowledge capital nor challenge capital in their
respective assessments. For both of them they are convinced that nothing new can emerge without
a fundamental breakthrough and transformation of society and human nature. In addition to this
countering the idea of reclaiming norms, it also asks for a large-scale transition without offering a
viable path towards it. While they both agree that something must be done, by proposing something
akin to a new religion, they afford themselves time that we simply do not have. If creating a new
ethic is so important, then perhaps it would not necessarily need to be a new shift, but rather a
reclamation of history and rethinking how we see the world.
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A Reclamation of History
In his book The Art of Not Being Governed, James C. Scott argues in favor of a new form
of area studies. He formulates his region of study “based on ecological regularities and structural
relationships that do not hesitate to cross national frontiers.”90 Countering area studies based on
nationality (Laos, Cambodia, etc.) or strategic conceptions (Southeast Asia) the conception of
“Zomia” in this area of the world allows for new forms of analysis. In his book, Scott focuses
squarely on cultures in and around the Mekong. He argues that much of the history of Southeast
Asia is a dialectical history of upstream and downstream people, a history of living under a state
and a history of living in active resistance to state power. Scott says:
“Most, if not all, the characteristics that appear to stigmatize hill peoples—their
location at the margins, their physical mobility, their swidden agriculture, their flexible
social structure, their religious heterodoxy, their egalitarianism, and even the nonliterate,
or oral cultures—far from being the mark of primitives left behind by civilization are better
seen on a long view as adaptations designed to evade both state capture and state formation.
They are, in other words, political adaptations of nonstate peoples to a world of states that
are, at once, attractive and threatening.”91
What Scott argues here is that the conceptions of civilization, especially in Southeast Asia,
actively suppress the material historical conditions. Rather than being backwards people, he argues
that there is much more agency in the histories of the “hill peoples.” He calls this an anarchist
history of Southeast Asia, but he views this history as completed. He argues that this history of
evading state control that appeared in the Zomia for more than a millennium ended in the last sixty
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years.92 To Scott, the history of Southeast Asia that was so vibrant has fallen prey to the imperial
natures and homogenization project and was killed. While he documents and reexamines history,
Scott fails to connect this to an opportunity for a reclamation of norms and a path forward for the
Mekong.
While Scott may see this as merely an historical event, it provides a great opportunity for
reconsidering alternative forms in Southeast Asia. Rather than following Lane or Taylor and
having to start fresh, why not look toward history in Southeast Asia using Scott’s own words and
see if that can provide a framework for an alternative. Scott focused on hill people versus valley
people in his form of analysis but in his preface to the book he wrote, “Had I the patience and even
more the impulse to comprehensiveness there would and should have been a chapter on watery
regions of refuge. I mention them only in passing and regret I haven’t been able to do them
justice.”93 With this, Scott acknowledges that evasion of states and alternative forms of governance
do not need to be solely based on foraging in the hills, but could utilize water just as easily. Later
on he says “rivers or seat transportation take advantage of ‘routes of least friction,’ of least
geographic resistance, and thereby vastly extends the distance over which food supplies, salt, arms,
and people can be exchanged. In epigrammatic form, we could say that ‘easy’ water ‘joins’”94
There needs to be an inclusive nature for building any alternative form of society. The fact that
water can connect and join people across different places so easily can serve as the basis for
forming solidarities and creating inclusiveness. Additionally, in his critique of the major state
projects in Southeast Asia, Scott touches on something important but doesn’t dive deeper into it.
He writes, “The common denominator here is that all such states have been created near navigable
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water courses, but above the flood plain, where a flat arable plain and perennial streams made wetrice cultivation possible. It is striking that none of the early mainland states was located in the delta
of a major river. Such delta regions—the Irrawaddy, the Chao Phraya, and the Mekong—were
settled in force and planted to wet rice only in the early twentieth century.” 95 Scott fails to
recognize the importance of this since his project did not address promoting an alternative future
or taking the findings from the study of Zomia to interpret the present day. However, by saying
that none of the major delta regions were settled in force by major kingdoms throughout history
highlights something important—that these regions have the ability to connect but not dominate.
That none of the major mainland states were located on the major deltas signifies that the rivers
were used to connect with other places but remain in harmony. Historically, for those trying to
dominate other cultures or subsume other peoples, this was not helpful. For a politics of solidarity
and inclusiveness, though, this would be fantastic. These regions would be ideal for as Scott said
earlier, “water joins.” Additionally, that none of these delta regions were settled in force and
planted wet rice only in the twentieth century shows the ability of these regions to change.

Subsistence Perspective and Buen Vivir
Maria Mies formulates what this might look like by calling it the “subsistence perspective.”
She says, “A subsistence perspective can be realized economically only in smaller, regionally
limited, decentralized areas.”96 A largescale biodiverse river like the Mekong that already is so
enmeshed in daily life for so many provides the perfect location for a subsistence perspective to
be enacted. Additionally, since subsistence fishing and agriculture along the Mekong has existed
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for millennia, there is already the fulfillment of Mies’ definition of subsistence production or “the
satisfaction of limited, concrete needs.”97 Mies continues in delineating what it would look like to
reinvent the commons by making an argument for regionalization and localization and calling it a
resistance tactic.98 She says, “This means production, exchange and consumption within the
region, so that an ecological regional reproduction takes place. Only in such regions can people
form communities and feel responsible for the region.”99 What better place for this to occur than
on the Mekong River. On the Mekong, disparate cultures are already tied together through their
historical ties to the river. The biodiversity and health of the river affords the people of the Mekong
the opportunity for a robust regional economy based around caring for the river. Since these 50
million peoples are all reliant on the river, they need the river to be socio-ecologically resilient. As
in Ostrom’s charts before, they need the reproduction of the river to occur so they can continue
living. They are the ones who are being squeezed and pushed up against by the interests of capital
in the current framework. The subsistence perspective is based on creating and maintaining life.100
Additionally, the subsistence perspective in rural areas along the Mekong can be implemented
easily as, historically, gender relations amongst indigenous communities have been relatively
egalitarian.101
The subsistence perspective provides an alternative framework but doesn’t answer for what
the quality of life would be within this subsistence-based production. The concept of Buen Vivir
(Spanish for “good life”) can help formulate how Mies’ subsistence perspective could work as an
alternative to the homogenization effort of capital along the Mekong. Buen Vivir means living as
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part of the natural world and embracing indigenous knowledge by placing the world in a biocentric rather than anthropocentric framework. Along a biodiverse hotbed like the Mekong, this
makes sense as many diverse ethnic groups all prioritize different aspects of the river. Buen Vivir
views the human relationship with the natural environment as key and under this framework
development is not achieved by reaching a consumption-based modernity but rather by achieving
the “good life.” This has been used around the world, and in Ecuador they were able to include
Sumac Kawsay, the Ecuadorian version of Buen Vivir, into their constitution.102
While this may not sketch a concrete solution or path, it may not have to. Pushing for the
sustenance of society by following traditional values is inherently a resistance activity since the
homogenization project of global capital accelerates a shift away from indigenous norms and
values.103 Ian Scoones et al. contend that, “A new politics therefore must combine concerns with
redistribution (and so concerns with class, social difference and inequality), recognition (and so
identity and identification) and representation (and so democracy, community, belonging and
citizenship).”104 The subsistence perspective incorporated within the conception of Buen Vivir
would do this by maintaining the local environmental and indigenous knowledge and supporting
it. If it is the homogenization project that got us into the problem, then it would need to be an
alternative to solve it. Scoones et al go on to say. “Alternatives are increasingly framed as
inherently relational, multi-class and multi-sectoral, historical and global. Across the world,
movements around environment/food/energy and sustainability/justice are building alternatives
based on distributive networks and collaborative commons.105 Localizing it on the Mekong
provides an alternative that can follow this path and create a more just and equitable region.
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For this, Felix Guattari’s treatise, The Three Ecologies, provides more on how to expand.
He states, “One might object that large-scale struggles are not necessarily in sync with ecological
praxis and the micropolitics of desire, but that’s the point: it is important not to homogenize various
levels of practice or to make connections between them under some transcendental supervision,
but instead to engage them in processes of heterogenesis.”106 For Guattari, it becomes clear that
not only alternatives must be found, but they must be found by avoiding panaceas or one-stop
solutions. Scoones et al. agree in saying, “there will never be a one size fits all version of
emancipatory rural politics, and locating our debate about alternatives in different contexts will
hopefully generate a more nuanced and variegated view.”107 One thing that is certain is these
alternatives cannot look like what is currently constructed. In trying to overcome the global climate
crisis, if western elites intervene in this crisis and are allowed to be the leaders seeking to transform
any indigenous or local knowledge into the terms that they have championed, we have already
seen the failures that will occur. Negating that, and looking for the heterogenesis of alternatives
focuses directly on the overlooked indigenous knowledges for answers.

Prefiguration
In Cambodia there is an opportunity for this. With the Land Law of 2001 and the Forestry
Law of 2002, Cambodia was the first country in Southeast Asia that gave indigenous peoples
specific land rights. The law “provides those defined as “indigenous” with extraordinary land
rights and recognizes their right to manage and use the land according to their customs with
collective ownership.”108 While this does nothing to contend with the aspect of the dam building
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and stopping dams, it legally gives indigenous peoples the rights to challenge capital and showcase
alternatives based on TEK. The key resistance activity becomes social reproduction of their
customs and maintaining their livelihoods through living sustainably. In fact, these indigenous
knowledges have been characterized by elites within society as “backward destroyers of natural
resources and forests.”109 This has been the main justification for intergovernmental plans at
‘modernizing” the indigenous areas between Southern Laos, Northern Cambodia, and Central
Vietnam.110 This modernization effort is what Scott describes as an effort by state systems to
conquer and subsume indigenous peoples. It is a top down homogenization effort to bring all who
oppose under the global capitalist regime. By utilizing the Land Law to their advantage these
indigenous Cambodians can offer a framework for the future.
While ignored at the elite and governmental level, this issue of livelihoods and survival,
can serve as a catalyst for resistance. Bron Taylor states that “popular ecological resistance often
originates in a desperate quest for survival as industrial processes threaten habitual modes of
existence and as people recognize that their well-being is threatened by environmental degradation.
Most ecological resistance is indeed In Defense of Livelihood.”111 This has been included in the
literature on the “environmentalism of the poor.” This framework puts people who otherwise
would not be politically active in a position of agency and perhaps more importantly resists the
homogenization project. As Guha and Martinez-Alier say it, “To put it in more explicitly
ecological terms, these conflicts pit ‘ecosystem people’ – that is, those communities which depend
very heavily on the natural resources of their own locality—against ‘omnivores’, individuals and
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groups with the social power to capture, transform and use natural resources from a much wider
catchment area; sometimes, indeed, the whole world.”112 Therefore, in this instance, resistance
offered by the people reliant on the river, functions as Guha and Martinez Alier’s qualifications
for environmental reaction of the poor.113 These ecosystem people are people within Southeast
Asia who historically have not depended on the global capitalist system. In Cambodia specifically,
they were granted a period of relative isolation and continued their longstanding indigenous
traditions after the fall of the Khmer Rouge. They have been incorporated in the global system
recently, but are seeing their livelihoods challenged as their innate indigenous knowledge is not
recognized as valuable in the western framework. Their livelihood and life processes are
antithetical to the government policies promoting dam building. This recent transformation of
society affords an opportunity to resist by enabling mobilization and politicization of a new
generation of ecosystem people who seek to preserve their indigenous heritage, cultures, and
livelihoods.
In Scott’s earlier work, he provided circumstances leading to when peasants in colonial
Southeast Asia engaged in rebellion or fought back. Scott argued this resistance focused on a moral
threshold. When this threshold was met, an actual existing political, economic or social system
strayed too far from what he calls the ‘notion of economic justice’ or the just distribution of assets,
resources and opportunities.114 By pushing people off of their lands and forcing a specific form of
external development upon them, the notions of economic justice have strayed too far along the
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Mekong. The question then becomes what are the principles that would enable the lack of
economic justice to create a true resistance?

Eros and Disasters
While sometimes described as utopian, principles of solidarity, collaboration, liberty and
social justice have been proven to galvanize the masses. Solidarities so forged can produce an
“eros effect.” This eros effect, first articulated by Herbert Marcuse and then expanded upon by
George Katsiaficas argues for transcendental qualities of social movements wherein suddenly
popular moments occur and radically transform the social order. Eros doesn’t deny the hegemonic
power the elites have in society. However, “during moments of the eros effect, universal interests
become generalized at the same time as dominant values of society (national chauvinism,
hierarchy, and domination) are negated.”115 Instead of trying to compete with the elites at their
own struggle for power and control, eros is based on moments of spontaneous uprising and
solidarity. What becomes clear in these moments, is that potential alternatives must be articulated
as options for a future, otherwise the unique indigenous identity and authority of these people is
undermined.
In his book Asia’s Unknown Uprisings, Katsiaficas documents the uprisings that swept
across Asia during the 1980s. Like Guattari, Katsiaficas documents how diversity of tactics are
essential for successful resistance.116 He also documents how in times of eros, communication and
messaging in favor of emancipation can catalyze across borders. In contrast to Samuel
Huntington’s “Third Wave” of democratization, Katsiaficas sees continued and sustained
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uprisings against a structurally unjust system as the only way toward a true and just democracy
based on freedom.
As climate disasters only accelerate throughout the world, alternative visions have the
ability to spread like never before. In her book A Paradise Built in Hell, Rebecca Solnit argues
that disasters momentarily suspend the established social order and generate fluid situations where
people react with feelings of empathy and collaboration that flip the capitalist-established social
constructions.117 Both Katsiaficas’ and Solnit’s theories breathe life into the increased potential of
an alternative future especially one which pays heed to maintenance of an ecosystem in
equilibrium.
In a time of crisis and disaster all potential responses must be included in the discourse in
order to find true solutions. While elites will push for the status quo, during our potentially
imminent climate catastrophe, the status quo has proven that it is a failure. With continuing and
greater environmental problems on the horizon, it is in this moment that Katsiaficas sees an
opportunity to install a Guattarian style heterogenesis of ideas for a future based upon Buen Vivir
principles and Mies’ version of subsistence. By showing the morally corrupt global system’s
inherent failure to not consider its most vulnerable people, Guattari sees moments of crisis as a
time, “to get social and political practices back on their feet, working for humanity and not simply
for a permanent reequiliberation of capitalist semiotic Universe.”118
The Situation Today
In Cambodia, 65-year-old Hun Sen has ruled for over thirty years and has claimed he will
rule until death. He has recently been asking western leaders for help in mitigation efforts on
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climate change. Although he admits climate change is an issue, he prioritizes short term economic
growth seeking short term solutions to lift his country out of poverty over creating a sustainable
future. In Laos, Bounnhang Vorachith, the President, is 79 years old. He has continued the push
for Laos to become the battery of Southeast Asia through dams in direct opposition to the ICEM
report. In Vietnam, Nguyen Phu Trong, the General Secretary of the Politburo, is 73 years old, and
has said he sees one party rule as the best direction for his country in order to transition into an
industrial economy.119 By having highly-centralized leaderships, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam’s
governing structures make potential alternatives nearly impossible through the state system.
Looking elsewhere along the Mekong, better options do not exist through the state either. Thailand
has been under a military junta since 2014, Myanmar remains under constant threat of military
control as well, and in China, Xi Jinping controls the government and curbs any form of dissent.
While these leaders maintain a stranglehold over the political sphere, the social spheres are rapidly
transforming.
The median age in Cambodia is just over 25 years old, in Laos it is 23 years old, and in
Vietnam it is 30.5 years old.120 In the entire ASEAN, 65% of the region is under 35 years old.
According to the World Economic Forum these countries have some of the highest percentages of
workers in vulnerable employment. Vulnerable employment is the characterization of the number
of unpaid family workers or informal “own-account workers.” In other words, this translates to
workers who are not enmeshed in the global capitalist system. Since these respective populations
are largely rural, the majority of people are already taking part in subsistence-based production.
64% of Cambodia, 83% of Laos, and 63% of Cambodia’s labor force fall under this
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categorization.121 The World Economic Forum (WEF) sees this an opportunity to transform these
countries’ economies in their own way. However, the report on the future of human capital issued
by the WEF, recognizes that the biggest challenge to the future of ASEAN are two key concerns:
resource constraints and pressure from shareholders/short term profitability. 122 These concerns
confront the future challenges of ASEAN and the region. The WEF, as champion for the global
economic system, must prioritize changing these countries’ economic growth to work within the
global system. However even in the report’s future challenges section, it notes that these short term
profits directly coincide with destruction of natural resources. We see that directly with the
proliferation of the dams along the Mekong. The short term economic growth and electric growth
generated is no salve for the long term devastation it places upon communities. Much like a
previous generation of land grabs with mining, profiteering corporations are able to pack up and
leave after extracting the natural resources. The case of a river is different from a mine however
as a river does not remain isolated and it directly serves as the connection for such a large portion
of peoples.123 This connection provides a spark for organizing and uniting the disparate
populations of over 100 ethnic groups and the rising young population growing up in the face of
greater climate chaos all of whom are reliant on the Mekong.
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Conclusion
On the river, following a drought or flood, the local populations who have lived for
generations off the land have adopted and learned how to react resiliently. Ashley Dawson argues
that the character of the modern state is to outsource risk to individuals and communities.124 In
doing this, the state abdicates or never took on many of the responsibilities necessary in order to
respond to emergencies like droughts and floods.125 The absence of state oversight allows for those
effected to prefigure what their ideal society would look like without state intervention, much as
Scott argued is the historical background of Zomia. George Katsiaficas sees much of Peter
Kropotkin’s ideas fitting in perfectly within his idea of eros.126 Kropotkin wrote the best response
to a disaster is that “which springs up spontaneously, under stress of immediate need, will be
infinitely preferable to anything invented between four walls by hidebound theorists sitting on any
number of committees.”127 The indigenous knowledges in Southeast Asia present an opportunity
for reclaiming norms based on the principles of sustainability and subsistence. Katsiaficas notes
that uprisings and resistance efforts are essential to revolution and alternative futures. Kropotkin
said the reason people revolt is “simply because the conditions grew unbearable. Not one or two,
or tens, but hundreds of similar revolts have preceded and must precede every revolution. Without
these no revolution was ever wrought.”128 We can see traces of this in Krasaing, Cambodia. It was
there that Laura Schoenberger documented how the Land Order 1 could be used to galvanize a
movement to win back land. She says, that the “uncertain and arbitrary nature of state and state
authority in Cambodia” can be destabilized by the Land Order 1.129 By showcasing the lack of
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responsiveness from the central state to the rural citizens, the indigenous people in Kraisang were
able to oppose the state. Not only did they express opposition though, they delegitimized the state
by creating a campaign focused on enabling citizens to have the legal rights afforded to them with
Land Order 1. In that community they won and proved that rural resistance even in modern
Cambodia can prevail.
It is these types of wins that can serve as catalysts for a larger movement. The people of
the Mekong have an opportunity for an alternative future. This alternative is necessary to maintain
their survival. Elites and peasants alike recognize the entire river ecosystem is in a period of
change. As the Former Prime Minister Dung of Vietnam says, “Never before has the Mekong river
basin been confronted with so many challenges.”130 Whereas elites are seeing these challenges as
ways for them to profit, it is the ecosystem people along the Mekong partaking in subsistence
activities that provide the opportunity for an alternative sustainable future for the world. It is the
biodiversity of the river and the diversity of tactics that may save them and provide a path forward.
Perhaps it does not take a radically alternative future, but rather it takes reclaiming history and
learning to live via the subsistence perspective to achieve Buen Vivir that is necessary along the
Mekong. Hopefully this can serve as inspiration to other resistance struggles elsewhere and
provide the basis for a heterogenesis of a new ecologically sustainable world.
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